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Recent discussion of legal ethics in Canada has focused on the importance of "civitity" as a
fundamental value and goat of ethical conduct. This comment questions that focus. After
defining the content of "civility' and reviewing its treatment in these initiatives by both the
law societies and the courts, the author suggests that the emphasis on civility is misplaced.
Focusing on civility has the undesirable tendency to impede lawyer reporting of misconduct
by other lawyers and potentially undermines the effective representation of client interests.
It also shifts emphasis away from the ethical values that shoutd be the focus of our attention,
namely Loyalty to clients and ensuring the proper functioning of the justice system.
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conduite 6thique. Cet article remet cet int6r~t en question. Apr~s avoir d6fini te contenu de
[a « civilit6 >> et avoir analys6 La facon dont it est trait6 dans ces initiatives, et par les ordres
des avocats, et par les tribunaux, rauteur sugg~re que ['accent sur la civilit6 est mat ptac6.
Le fait de se concentrer sur La civilit6 tend, de mani~re ind6sirabte, 6 g6ner le signalement,
par les autres avocats, d'une conduite incongrue, et pourrait 6branter Ia repr6sentation
efficace de t'int6r~t du client. Cela d6tourne aussi ['attention loin des valeurs 6thiques qui
devraient 6tre au centre de notre attention, en particuLier le fait d'@tre loyal envers tes
cients et de veilter h ce que Le syst~me judiciaire fonctionne convenablement.
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I. INTRODUCTION
THE LEGAL PROFESSION cares about civility. Over the past thirty years in
North America, and particularly over the past ten years in Canada, legal
regulators and professional associations have undertaken initiatives to foster and
encourage lawyer civility-and to discourage and even penalize lawyer incivility.1
This commentary challenges the civility movement. It argues that to the
extent that civility means the enforcement of good manners amongst lawyers, it
is not a proper subject for professional regulation. To the extent that civility
encompasses other ethical values-respect and loyalty to clients, respectfulness
to the general public, and ensuring the proper functioning of the legal system-
the use of "civility" as an all-encompassing ethical value obscures the real ethical
principles at play. Imposing a broadly defined obligation of "civility" does not
meet the goal of principles of legal ethics and professional regulation: to guide
counsel as to what is required of an ethical lawyer.
This commentary develops this argument in three parts. First, it identifies
how civility has been defined by the Canadian legal profession. It considers
civility initiatives undertaken by organizations such as the Canadian Bar
Association (CBA), as well as law society disciplinary decisions in which lawyers
have been sanctioned for incivility. Second, it critiques attempts to regulate the
manners of lawyers, focusing in particular on the risk that such attempts will
undermine self-regulation and the pursuit of client interests. Third, it critiques
the inclusion of other fundamental ethical values within the concept of
"civility," arguing that rules directed at ensuring that lawyers appropriately
balance and pursue honesty, loyalty, respectfulness, and justice should be
identified as such. An omnibus requirement of "civility" does not give sufficient
guidance to lawyers about what the duty to be ethical requires.
1. The initiatives undertaken in Canada are indicated in Section II, below, and include the
Advocates' Society's Principles of Civility for Advocates, infra note 4. The Law Society of
Alberta and the Nova Scotia Barristers' Society have also made efforts to improve civility.
The former Chief Justice of Ontario R. Roy McMurtry has spoken on the issue of civility in
legal practice. See "Advocacy and Professionalism" (Remarks presented to the Advocacy
Policy Forum, 17 February 2004), online: The Advocates' Society <http://www.advocates.ca/
pro%20bono/pdf/Advocacy.pdf>. For a discussion of civility concerns in the United States, see
Bronson Bills, "To Be or Not to Be: Civility and the Young Lawyer" (2005) 5 Conn. Pub.
Int. L.J. 31; Brenda Smith, "Civility Codes: The Newest Weapohs in the 'Civil' War Over
Proper Attorney Conduct Regulations Miss Their Mark" (1998) 24 U. Dayton L. Rev. 151;
and Monroe Freedman, "Civility Runs Amok" (14 August 1995) Legal Times 470.
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II. WHAT DOES CIVILITY MEAN?
As employed by the legal profession, "civility" clearly encompasses two separate
areas of concern. It refers primarily to the requirement that other people, and in
particular other lawyers, be treated with courtesy, manners, and politeness.
Thus, the Law Society of Alberta's Office of the Practice Advisor has defined
incivility as "sharp conduct or shoddy treatment of other lawyers, opposing
parties and even independent witnesses."' The Nova Scotia Barristers' Society
2002 Task Force on Civility defined civility as "akin to notions of courtesy,
politeness, good manners and respect."'
Similarly, the Canadian Bar Association and Advocates' Society Principles
of Civility for Advocates4 include numerous rules directed primarily at courtesy
towards others. The rules direct lawyers to "always be courteous and civil to
Counsel engaged on the other side of the lawsuit, ' to treat witnesses with
"appropriate respect," to avoid "discourteous comments,"' and to "avoid ill-
considered or uninformed criticism of the competence, conduct, advice,
appearance or charges of other Counsel."7
In every provincial law society decision reported on Quicklaw in which the
term "civility" is used,8 the allegation of incivility arose from the lawyer's use of
2. Nancy Carruthers & Ross McLeod, "Civility Revisited" The Advisory 3 (November 2005) 7,
online: <http://www.lawsocietyalberta.com/files/benchersadvisory/V315.pdf>. See also Paul
McLaughlin, "Civility and Practice Management: Flying Solo" Benchers'Advisory 68
(January 2001) 12, online: <http://www.lawsocietyalberta.com/LSAArchives/files/
benchersadvisory/i68_jan0 l-arcadvisory ixSFfrjl.0.pdf>; Barry Vogel, "The Civility
Initiative: Time for Action" Benchers'Advisory 63 (February 2000) 13, online:
<http://www.lawsocietyalberta.com/LSAArchives/files/benchersadvisory/i63-feb00-
arcadvisory_ixSFfr_1.0.pdf>.
3. Nova Scotia Barristers' Society, Task Force on Professional Civility, 2002 Report (available
from the Nova Scotia Barristers' Society) at 2.
4. The Canadian Bar Association, Principles of Civilityfor Advocates, reprinted as an appendix to
the Code of Professional Conduct (Ottawa: Canadian Bar Association, 2006) [CBA,
Principles]. See also The Advocates' Society, Principles of Civility for Advocates (which are
identical), online: <http://www.advocates.ca/civility/principles.html>.
5. CBA, Principles, ibid., r. 1.
6. Ibid., r. 23.
7. Ibid., r. 26.
8. Based on a search of "civility" in Quicklaw's Law Society Discipline Decisions, online:
<http://www.lexisnexis.ca>.
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strong, profane and/or flatly rude language towards another person. In all cases
the concern about civility, and the justification for the sanction imposed on the
lawyer, appears to have arisen from the lawyer's lack of courtesy or politeness.9
In a 2002 decision, the Law Society of Alberta discussed civility as a form of
politeness, noting that "[launching or exchanging insults is not professional
behaviour."1 Similarly, the Law Society of Upper Canada has defined civility in
terms of communications between counsel and others, emphasizing that while not
all "strongly-worded or ill-received communications" are problematic,
"[o]verwrought opinion, misplaced hyperbole, or a desire to intimidate, sully or
defame have no place in communications from lawyers."11 Given the fine line
between candour and slander, a lawyer should "err on the side of courtesy."12
This first meaning of civility therefore addresses the manner in which
counsels communicate with each other, specifically the politeness and courtesy,
or lack thereof, in lawyer communication. The second meaning of civility is
more substantial, referring generally to the conduct essential to ensure the
proper functioning of the judicial process, with a specific focus on advocacy.
The CBA Principles deal significantly with the obligation of a lawyer to ensure
the expeditious and effective delivery of justice. This obligation includes duties
to comply with undertakings,13 to ensure that draft orders "accurately and
9. However, as will be discussed below, in a number of cases the impoliteness caused concern
not only because the lawyer was rude (although in fact the lawyer was disciplined in most of
the cases solely for being rude, not because of other concerns); in some cases the rudeness
indicated a lack of proper loyalty to the client and/or efforts to ensure the proper functioning
of the legal system (although, again, these underlying concerns do not appear to have been
the basis for the discipline). The cases in which lawyers have been subject to regulatory review
for incivility are: Law Society ofAlberta v. Christensen, 2007 LSA 3; Law Society of British
Columbia v. Goldberg, 2007 LSBC 40 [Goldberg]; Law Society of Upper Canada v. Wagman,
2007 ONLSHP 39 [Wagman]; Law Society of Upper Canada v. Kay, 2006 ONLSHP 31 [Kay
No.112]; Law Society ofAlberta v. Arends, [2006] L.S.D.D. No. 50 (QL) [Arends]; Law
Society ofAlberta v. McCourt, [2005] L.S.D.D. No. 91 (QL); Law Society of Upper Canada v.
Carter, 2005 ONLSHP 24 [Carter]; Law Soiety ofAlberta v. Pozniak, [2002] L.S.D.D. No.
55 (QL) [Pozniak]; Nova Scotia Barristers'Society v. Richey, 2002 NSBS .8; Nova Scotia
Barristers'Society v. Ayre, [1998] L.S.D.D. No. 8 (QL); and Nova Scotia Barristers'Society v.
Murrant, 1995 NSBS 10 [Murrant].
10. Pozniak, ibid. at para. 17.
11. Kay No. 112, supra note 9 at para. 19.
12. Ibid.
13. CAA, Principles, supra note 4, rr. 8-10. The Principles in this respect are often substantially
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completely reflect[] the Court's ruling,"" to refrain from engaging in discovery
merely to impose a financial burden on the other side, 5 and to refrain from
submitting perjured evidence to the court.1" This second class of civility
obligations thus requires more than polite behaviour from a lawyer. It requires a
lawyer to assist in the effective and expeditious functioning of the legal system.
The following sections assess the validity of these two categories of civility
as ethical obligations.
III. IS COURTESY A MORAL GOOD?
The argument against civility as a moral good is hardly self-evident. After all,
politeness, decency, and kindness to others seem like basic moral obligations
with which everyone is familiar and to which everyone should adhere. One
commentator has gone so far as to suggest that civility guidelines for lawyers are
akin to what one might learn in kindergarten about being "nice to each other"
and "kind to the teacher."
1 7
The problem, however, is that the ethical obligations of a lawyer are not
the same as those of a kindergarten student. It is the unenviable job of a lawyer
to argue for the guilty to be acquitted, to ask unpleasant personal questions of
duplicative of obligations imposed on lawyers by provincial law society codes of conduct. For
example, the Law Society of Upper Canada's Rules of Professional Conduct (Toronto: Law
Society of Upper Canada, 2007) [LSUC, Rules] provides in r. 4.01(7) that a lawyer must
"strictly and scrupulously carry out an undertaking given to the tribunal or to another
licensee in the course of litigation"; r. 6.03(10) requires that a lawyer "shall not give an
undertaking that cannot be fulfilled and shall fulfill every undertaking given."
14. CBA, Principles, supra note 4, r. 16. This would perhaps fall within LSUC, Rules, ibid.,
where r. 4.01(2)(0 prohibits knowingly misstating the contents of a document (although this
may be directed at misrepresentations to the tribunal); r. 6.01(1) requires that a lawyer act so
as to maintain the integrity of the legal profession; and r. 6.03(3) requires that lawyers avoid
"sharp practice."
15. CBA, Principles, ibid., r. 25. See in general LSUC, Rules, ibid., r. 4.01(4) and in particular r.
4.01 (4 )(c) (which prohibit the lawyer making "frivolous requests for the production of
documents" or "frivolous demands for information at the examination for discovery").
16. CBA, Principles, ibid., r. 56. See also LSUC, Rules, ibid., where r. 4.01(2)(b) prohibits a
lawyer from "knowingly" assisting a client to "do anything that the lawye considers to be
dishonest or dishonourable"; r. 4.01(2)(e) prohibits a lawyer from "knowingly" attempting
to "deceive a tribunal or influence the course of justice by offering false evidence."
17. Susan N. Turner, "Raising the Bar: Maximizing Civility in Alberta Courtrooms" (2003) 41
Alta. L. Rev. 547 at 557.
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people who would rather not answer them, and to attempt to win even where
victory imposes costs on others. Lawyers do not and should not "share and be
nice" where to do so impinges either on their loyalty their client or their fidelity
to the legal system.1"
This does not mean that lawyers must be uncivil, but it does mean that
disciplining lawyers for incivility-and even attempting to foster a culture of
civility-may have negative ethical consequences.
Most significantly, an undue emphasis on civility has the potential to
undermine the ability of law societies to fulfill their obligation to regulate lawyers'
ethics. As members of a self-regulating profession, lawyers must hold each other
to account. They must be actively engaged with each other's ethics and
professionalism, and must be critical where necessary. Emphasizing civility has
the significant potential to dampen the effect of this function, and to foster
professional protectionism.. If a strongly-worded criticism will subject a lawyer to
discipline for incivility she will, naturally, be less likely to make that criticism even
if it is well-founded. Knowing the difficulty of proving the truth of allegations of
professional misconduct,19 she will simply refrain from making them.
In several of the disciplinary decisions lawyers were sanctioned for making
allegations about the competence or ethics of other lawyers."0 In each case it
appears that the remarks were largely unfounded, as no supporting evidence
was introduced to the disciplining law society. However, assume for the
moment that the allegations had a foundation in truth. Presumably
information about the ethics and competence of other counsel-however
rudely and impolitely expressed-is something that should be brought before
the appropriate authorities.21 Had the allegations been substantiated with some
18. The idea of lawyers as having ethical obligations of "fidelity to the legal system" is Bradley
W. Wendel's. See generally Bradley W. Wendel, "Professionalism as Interpretation" (2005)
99 Nw. U.L. Rev. 1167.
19. Harry W. Arthurs has observed that even law societies struggle with this problem, and tend
as a result to discipline lawyers for offences easily proven, rather than those which are more
ambiguous. See Harry W. Arthurs, "Why Canadian Law Schools Don't Teach Legal Ethics"
in Kim Economides, ed., Ethical Challenges to Legal Education and Conduct (Oxford: Hart
Publishing, 1998) at 105.
20. See Goldberg, supra note 9; Carter, Kay No. 112, supra note 9; and Murrant, supra note "9
(although in Murrant the remarks appear to have flown from the deterioration of a "personal
relationship" between Murrant and the lawyer in question).
21. See LSUC, Rules, supra note 13, where r. 6.01(3) requires that lawyers report misconduct by
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evidence we could have seen examples of this in Goldberg,22 in which the lawyer
being investigated for misconduct had criticized another counsel to the Court,
and in Carter,23 in which the lawyer had criticized another counsel to the legal
aid society. Bringing forward concerns of this type is, I. would argue, prima facie
good and desirable. If the allegations were unfounded and untrue that is not
good.2" But comments that are grounded in fact should be made; that they are
made rudely does not warrant disciplining the lawyers who make them. Any
other outcome creates the impression, as Goldberg argued in his submissions,
that "the Law Society is dominated by considerations of professional courtesy
and collegiality ... [that] ultimately inhibit their truth seeking function."25 If
ensuring the appropriate airing of ethical concerns with lawyers' conduct requires
occasional tolerance of incivility, rudeness, and overheated remarks, then so be it.
The law of defamation still exists to give protection to lawyers who are unfairly
subject to criticism by their colleagues. The addition of law society discipline
fosters protectionism unnecessarily and suppresses legitimate criticism.
26
In addition, lawyers should not have to be civil where it undermines their
ability to advocate for their client. Or, to put it differently, lawyers should not
be disciplined for incivility where it occurs in the context of protecting a client's
legal interests. In the case of Pozniak, a lawyer was representing himself in a real
estate transaction. The opposing counsel attempted to have his client impose a
condition on the real estate contract with respect to Pozniak's ability to assume
a mortgage. The client declined to do so. At closing, opposing counsel
nonetheless attempted to impose this condition as a trust condition. Pozniak
pointed out that doing so was improper, and the lawyer backed down.
However, the difficulties over the trust condition caused the closing to be
delayed, at which point the lawyer attempted to require Pozniak to pay daily
other lawyers, albeit only where the nature of that misconduct is serious. The commentary
goes on to say that lawyers are permitted to report "any instance involving a breach of these
rules." It seems odd that in a self-regulating profession it is necessary to indicate that lawyers
are permitted to report other lawyers who have breached the ethical rules of the profession.
22. Supra note 9.
23. Ibid.
24. Although also not necessarily something that is desirably inhibited through professional discipline.
25. Goldberg, supra note 9 at para. 26.
26. The one exception to this position may be where comments made by counsel are protected
by privilege because they are made in the courtroom. It may be that law society discipline is a
reasonable addition to defamation laws in that' instance.
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interest on the funds outstanding. Pozniak was understandably angry and wrote
to the lawyer (with whom he had gone to law school) saying "I regret to say this
[name], but you are clueless. I would hope that the other solicitors in your firm
are not similarly clueless."'" The Law Society of Alberta found this conduct
worthy of sanction and reprimanded Pozniak.
While this criticism was certainly not polite, it was fair. If Pozniak had
been representing a client other than himself, a strong resistance to the
approach of opposing counsel would have been warranted. It is more important
that the client's legal rights be protected from the unfair incursions of counsel
than that the lawyer attempting to do so be chided for incivility because of the
manner in which he expressed himself. Otherwise the lawyer may become
more, and perhaps excessively, concerned with the selection of his words rather
than with the rights of his clients.
It may be for this reason that on two recent occasions the Ontario Court of
Appeal, while deploring the lack of civility of counsel in litigation, declined to
find any relationship between counsel's incivility and the fairness of the trial
process. In both R. v. Felderhof28 and Marchand v. Public General Hospital
Society of Chatham," the court declined counsel's request for relief due to a trial
judge's failure to control the incivility of opposing counsel.
In addition to the uncertain relationship between civility and resolute
advocacy, and between civility and rigorous enforcement of lawyer ethics,
civility is also problematic because it tends to lie in the eye of the beholder.
One commentator has noted that in "the legal context, "civility" does not
have a precise meaning. Rather, it is a judicial construct signifying an attitude
of respect."3" That may be an accurate statement, but it does not provide
much guidance to a lawyer as to what constitutes incivility. This means that a
lawyer who wishes to avoid discipline for incivility may self-censor in part
because she does not know how her words will be perceived, and whether
what she perceives as fair comment will be perceived by the law society as
sanctionable misconduct. She may choose not to speak even though her
27. Pozniak, supra note 9 at para. 10.
28. (2003) 68 O.R. (3d) 481 (C.A.).
29. (2000) 51 O.R. (3d) 97 (C.A.).
30. Christopher J. Piazzola, "Ethical Versus Procedural Approaches to Civility: Why Ethics 2000
Should Have Adopted a Civility Rule" (2003) 74 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1197 at 1202-03.
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comments would be important for calling another lawyer to account for
improper behaviour, or in order to pursue the legal rights of her client.
This tendency is particularly problematic given that the historic collegiality
with which civility is often associated31 is also connected to discrimination and
intolerance for diversity. A diverse bar in which lawyers may simply have
different senses of what constitutes "polite" behaviour may require greater
tolerance of forms of expression than are countenanced by the civility
movement. Otherwise civility would become shorthand for elitism.32
This is not to say that all of the "civility" cases were wrongly decided;
rather, it is to say that to the extent that those cases were correctly decided, it
was because the rude behaviour of the lawyers in question implicated other
ethical values. The lawyers behaved unethically, but not because they were rude
per se. The validity of this broader definition of "civility" in the cases and
civility initiatives-in which "incivility" incorporates a broad array of
behaviours extending beyond simply bad manners or a lack of courtesy-is
discussed in the following section.
Before turning to that discussion, however, an objection to these
arguments must be addressed. The CBA Principles are not binding, but merely
provide "an educational tool for the encouragement and maintenance of civility
in our justice system."33 Thus, the ethical dangers identified here may be
overstated and may overlook the virtue of encouraging lawyers to be polite to
each other. The difficulty with this objection is that however voluntary the
CBA Principles may be, there are numerous cases reported from law societies
across the country in which lawyers have been disciplined in significant part
because of the incivility of their communication. Therefore, there is disciplinary
force to the civility movement. In addition, uncomfortable and rude speech
that contributes to proper lawyer regulation, and proper client representation, is
in itself a good thing, even if it occasionally results in incivility. As a
consequence, to the extent that the encouragement of civility discourages that
speech, it is not desirable.
31. Although not necessarily accurately. See Kathleen P. Browe, "A Critique of the Civility
Movement: Why Rambo Will Not Go Away" (1994) 77 Marq. L. Rev. 751 at 774 (where
she writes, "[i]t is important for proponents to realize that incivility and commercialism are
not new facets of the profession").
32. Ibid. at 777-78.
33. CBA, Principles, supra note 4 at 4.
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IV. FUNDAMENTAL ETHICAL VALUES AND CIVILITY
A more profound objection to the preceding argument against civility arises
from the incorporation of more fundamental ethical values in civility initiatives.
These include the incorporation of obligations related to efficient litigation
process, proper conduct in ex parte applications, and the general avoidance of
sharp practice and improperly aggressive litigation strategies ("Rambo" litigation).
The values underlying these requirements ensure that the ethics of the profession
are upheld, including a lawyer's proper loyalty to his or her clients. Indeed,
many if not all of the requirements of the civility initiatives are restatements or
specifications of existing rules of professional conduct."5 They are, in other
words, already an important part of lawyers' ethical obligations.
The inclusion of these fundamental ethical requirements within civility
initiatives is problematic nonetheless. First, as noted, the rules of professional
conduct in every province in Canada contain similar ethical obligations to those
imposed by these more substantive aspects of the civility guidelines.35 It is not
obvious that the response to the law societies' lack of rigorous enforcement of
their existing rules36 should be the enactment of more rules, especially where the
new rules specifically state that they will not be enforced.37
34. Freedman, supra note 1, and Smith, supra note 1. See LSUC, Rules, supra note 13, where r.
4.01(2) has a number of provisions related to the expedition of the litigation process,
including a prohibition on instituting malicious proceedings (r. 4 .01(2)(a)), assisting the
client in acting dishonestly or dishonourably (r. 4.01 (2)(b)), harassing a witness (r.
4.01(2)(k)), or needlessly inconveniencing a witness (r. 4 .01(2)(m)). In addition, r. 4.01(1)
places a general obligation on lawyers to treat a deciding tribunal with "candour, fairness,
courtesy, and respect." The commentary to r. 4.01 (1) adds that a lawyer "should avoid and
discourage the client from resorting to frivolous or vexatious objections, or from attempts to
gain advantage from slips or oversights not going to the merits, or from tactics that will
merely delay or harass the other side." With respect to sharp practice, r. 6.03(3) expressly
prohibits "sharp practice." Other LSUC rules that prohibit many of the tactics associated
with "Rambo" litigation include r. 4.01(4), which deals with discovery obligations, and r.
4.01(6), which requires a lawyer to be "courteous, civil, and act in good faith to the tribunal
and with all persons with whom the lawyer has dealings in the course of litigation."
35. See rules listed ibid. See also LSUC, Rules, supra notes 13-16.
36. See in general Arthurs, supra note 19.
37. The CBA, Principles, supra note 4, are said to be aspirational rather than binding, as are those
of the Advocates' Society. The preamble to the Appendix of the CBA's Code of Professional
Conduct, in which the Principles are set out, says the following: "These principles are not
intended as a code of professional conduct subject to enforcement by discipline or other
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Second, and more substantively, the emphasis on civility tends to obscure
the true nature' of the ethical misconduct of lawyers subject to discipline for
incivility. This is most evident in the civility cases where the discipline of the
lawyer was warranted not because the lawyer was rude, but rather because of the
nature of his rudeness-to whom he was rude, the way in which he was rude,
and the context in which the rudeness occurred. The nature of the rudeness in
those cases shows how the lawyer violated both his fundamental ethical
obligations of loyalty to the client and his duty to ensure the proper
functioning ,of the legal system. Those violations arguably warranted
professional discipline that the rudeness, in itself, did not. By disciplining the
lawyer not for these violations, but for rudeness, the disciplining law society
obscures the real ethical issues at play.
In Wagman3s for example, the lawyer was disciplined for, inter alia,
writing a letter to a mediator with whom he was having a billing dispute in
which he said "get ready because I can be ten times a bigger asshole than you.
You want to fight, go ahead," and for calling a Senior Casualty Claims
representative of the defendant insurer a "fucking cunt."39 The rudeness of
these comments is indisputable. What is more significant, however, is the
nature of the rudeness. In the first instance the rudeness was directed towards
an individual with whom he was having a fee dispute, and could well have
been viewed as a threat, or an attempt to employ non-legal, extra-judicial
means to obtain a legal benefit. In the second instance the rudeness was to a
participant in the litigation and, again, could have inhibited that individual's
willingness to participate openly and fully in the litigation process. In other
words, in both instances the rudeness was such that it arguably impacted the
functioning of the justice system and had the potential to disrupt an
individual's free and willing participation in that system.
sanction but as an educational tool for the encouragement and maintenance of civility in our
justice system." Of course, neither the CBA nor the Advocates' Society has any regulatory
authority over lawyers in any event. I am indebted to Adam Dodek for the general point
about the irrationality of responding to non-enforcement of existing rules with the
enactment of non-binding additional rules.
38. Supra note 9.
39. Ibid. at paras. 14 and 15.
40. A similar situation arose in Arends, supra note 9, in which the lawyer ended up in a "heated"
altercation with the client on the other side, saying to that client "why don't you blow me"
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In both Law Society of Upper Canada v. Kay No. 3941 and Law Society of
Alberta v. Willis42, lawyers were disciplined for rudeness towards their own
clients. In Kay No. 39, the lawyer, embroiled in a fee dispute with his client,
accused her of fraud and threatened to report her to the police. He wrote her
a letter in which he emphasized her recent immigration to Canada, stating, "I
would like to think that any Commonwealth country, including India, takes
the same dim view of your criminal activity., 43 In Willis the lawyer swore at
his client and ignored her instructions after he "became frustrated with what
he considered to be bizarre instructions to settle a file for less than an offer
the client had previously rejected."" In both these cases the issue is not that
the lawyers were rude and uncivil, although of course they were; it is that
their incivility was contrary to the interests of their clients. Instead of
facilitating their clients' autonomy in accessing the legal system, they
undermined it: in Kay No. 39 by giving the client groundless fears of criminal
prosecution, and in Willis by interfering with her judgment as to her best
course of action. That is unethical and would be unethical even had it been
done politely. A. polite but false indication that conduct may constitute a
crime, or a polite refusal to allow a client to exercise her own judgment after
and "fuck you." The client appears to have been provoking the lawyer, but the same
unethical interference with the pursuit of justice is raised by the lawyer's conduct. For the
ethical rules related to the conduct in these cases, see generally LSUC, Rules, supra note 13,
rr. 2, 4, which set out the obligations of the lawyer relative to his/her dealings with clients
and the administration of justice. More specifically, see r. 6.03(5), which prohibits a lawyer
from sending correspondence which is abusive or offensive; r. 5.03, which prohibits "verbal
or physical conduct of a sexual nature" where such conduct might "reasonably be expected to
cause insecurity, discomfort, offence, or humiliation to the recipient"; and r. 5.04, which
imposes a "special responsibility" on lawyers to "respect the requirements of human rights
laws in force in Ontario."
41. [2006] L.S.D.D. No. 39 [Kay No. 39].
42. [1995] L.S.D.D. No. 308 [Willis].
43. Kay No. 39, supra note 41 at para. 54.
44. Willis, supra note 42 at para. 7. For the ethical rules related to the conduct in this case, see
generally LSUC, Rules, supra note 13, r. 2.02(4), which prohibits a lawyer from threatening
to bring a criminal or quasi-criminal prosecution to secure a civil benefit for a client;
presumably the rule would also apply so as to prevent the lawyer from doing so in order to
obtain a civil benefit for himself. See also r. 5.04, requiring the lawyer to respect the
requirements of human rights laws; r. 4.01 (1), commentary, which prohibits the lawyer from
waiving or abandoning the client's legal rights "without the client's informed consent."
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receiving advice as to whether to accept a settlement, are as improper as rude
and impolite versions of the same conduct.
Disciplining these lawyers for violation of their fundamental ethical
obligations to clients and to the functioning of the justice system would be
justifiable and is what should be at issue in the cases. To talk about the
misconduct as incivility or rudeness obscures the real ethical problem with the
lawyers' conduct. This is significant not just because of fairness to these lawyers,
but also because it means that other lawyers reading the decisions are not
properly informed as to the nature of their ethical obligations.
Being an ethical lawyer is challenging-not always, and not in every
circumstance-but in general a lawyer is required to strike the difficult but
proper balance between competing ethical obligations so as to make the best
possible ethical decision she can. A lawyer must be loyal to her client, but she
must also ensure that the justice system functions effectively. She must be
honest but must also keep confidences. She must be resolute in her advocacy
but also ensure that she does not interfere with the fair functioning of the
justice system. She must be competent but also ensure access to justice for the
disadvantaged."5 Deciding what to do when those obligations conflict with each
other is difficult, and lawyers need all the guidance they can get: from
colleagues and the courts but also from law societies and bar associations. To
focus on civility, which not only fails to address these tensions but often flat out
denies that they exist, provides no useful guidance for the lawyer seeking to
resolve them."'
The desire to improve the ethics and conduct of the legal profession is
laudable. Focusing on civility does not accomplish this goal. Even defining
civility as encompassing real questions of ethical importance diminishes, rather
than enhances, the amount of guidance that counsel receive. Lawyers need to
understand and embrace the multi-faceted roles they serve in the legal system,
and learn how to resolve the difficult dilemmas those roles can present. Bar
associations and law societies should focus on providing lawyers with the
guidance that the civility movement cannot.
45. As discussed by Bryant G. Garth, competence is expensive, and requiring lawyers to achieve
high standards of competence can result in their services being priced out of the market. See
Bryant G. Garth, "Rethinking the Legal Profession's Approach to Collective Self-
Improvement: Competence and the Consumer Perspective" (1983) Wis. L. Rev. 639.
46. Browe, supra note 31 at 769.
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In a recent column on the Sports Illustrated website, senior football correspondent
Peter King had this to say about former Atlanta Falcons coach Bobby Petrino, who
quit his job near the end of a disastrous season in order to coach college football:
Goat of the Week
... Idiot. Weasel. One day after having permission to speak to Arkansas denied him
by the man who hired him for $4.8 million a year last winter, Petrino went ahead
and talked to Arkansas anyway. Then he rode out of Atlanta for Fayetteville under
the cover of darkness.
... If the other coaches in the SEC [Southeastern Conference] use Petrino's
carpetbagging skullduggery against him, good for them. I hope it works. That
wouldn't be negative recruiting. It would be truthful recruiting.
4 7
No one would call this description of Petrino's conduct civil. But it is a fair
comment, and it raises issues of importance to the world of football that
warrant discussion.
Lawyers should be free to make similar comments about each other, about
the courts, and about the functioning of the justice system. Hard-hitting and
unvarnished critiques are essential to working towards the justice system we
should have, and to ensuring that lawyers play the role they need to play within
that system. Pursuing the impossible dream of a positive public image, or
seeking to soften the discomfort of hearing unpalatable and uncivil truths, is
not required. What is required is strong and cogent debate about how lawyers
can be ethical-how they can balance the competing values inherent in the
difficult but fundamental role they play in a democratic society. The civility
movement should be abandoned in favour of this more difficult but ultimately
more fruitful and important task.
47. "Monday Morning Quarterback," Sports Illustrated (17 December 2007), online:
<http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2007/writers/peter_king/12/16lweek l5/4.html>.
